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T

his article charts the future transformations of the Canadian labor force
population using a microsimulation projection model. The model takes into
account differentials in demographic behavior and labor force participation of
individuals according to their ethnocultural and educational characteristics. Results of the microsimulation show that Canada's labor force population will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than in the recent past. By 2031, almost
one third of the country's total labor force could be foreign-born, and almost all
its future increase is expected to be fuelled by university graduates, while the
less-educated labor force is projected to decline. All projection scenarios show
that Canada’s overall participation rate will decline due to the retirement of the
Boomers and the slow growth of the workforce. The analyses suggest that the
most pertinent driver to be addressed is the differential in the labor force participation rates of the Canadian-born white population and immigrants and visible
minorities.

Key Findings

□

In 2031, the Canadian labor force population will be generally older,
more educated, and more ethnoculturally diversified.

□

The size of Canada’s labor force is not expected to decrease; a steady
increase is forecast over the next decades but at a slower rate than in
the recent past. According to the reference scenario, it would grow from
17.6 million persons in 2006 to approximately 21.5 million in 2031.

□

Due to the aging of the Canadian population, the overall labor force participation rate (ages 15+) is bound to decrease from 67% to between
64% and 60% depending on the projection scenarios.

□

but a minimal effect on the future labor force participation rate.
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♦
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♦
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♦

Graduate Students

Demographic drivers have an important impact on total labor force size

□

A better economic integration of immigrants and visible minorities would
have the highest policy leverage on Canada’s future overall participation
rate. Increasing immigration has no effect on the participation rate if immigrants continue to show lower work force participation.
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Tomorrowʼs Canadian Labor force
Background

Data and Methods

s a result of a rapid fall in fertility, the Canadian population has been undergoing a rapid demographic aging.
This aging process has now reached a critical turning point
as Boomers start to retire from the labor market in large
numbers. In response to declining fertility, Canada raised its
immigration intake at the end of the 1980s, and immigration
is now the main driver of population growth. In fact, net immigration is currently responsible for approximately twothirds of the demographic growth, leaving the remaining
third to the natural increase (births minus deaths).

he authors project the Canadian labor force population by
age, sex, education level, and ethnocultural composition
using DemoSim, a microsimulation projection model. This
model is dynamic in the sense that each simulated individual
ages according to a life-cycle behavioral model. DemoSim accounts for changes in population composition over the projected period and simulates internal migrations between the
different regions of Canada. A full description of the model and
its demographic assumptions can be found in the projection
reports by Statistics Canada (Bélanger & Caron Malenfant,
2005; Caron-Malenfant, Lebel, & Martel, 2010).

A

Meanwhile, immigrants to Canada are becoming more culturally diversified. Over the last half century, the main
source regions have shifted from Europe to Asia. As a result,
the 2006 Census showed a growing proportion of immigrants, of people belonging to visible minority groups and of
people with a “nonofficial” language as their mother tongue.
In parallel, the literature on labor market outcomes demonstrates a deterioration of economic conditions of immigrants
(Aydemir & Skuterud, 2004; Picot & Sweetman, 2005). Despite their higher educational attainment, immigrants have
lower participation rates in the labor market, higher unemployment rate, and lower income compared to the Canadianborn working-age population. Moreover, immigrants need
more time on average than in past decades to reach nonimmigrants’ economic outcomes in terms of income, employment and participation rate (Zietsma, 2007).
Other studies show that the economic gap between the Canadian-born and immigrant workers is wider among visible
minority groups (Bélanger, Bingoly-Liworo, & Ledent, 2010;
Tran, 2004) and for women also (Statistics Canada, 2008;
Zietsma, 2007). Finally, the overqualification rate is higher
among immigrants than among non-immigrants (Galarneau
& Morissette, 2008) and reaches worrying levels for highly
educated people (Gilmore, 2009).

Objectives
1.

2.

Project the Canadian labor force population up to 2031
by age, sex, educational attainment and ethnocultural
composition.
Analyze projection scenarios to assess the impact of
demographic drivers (fertility and immigration rate), of
participation rates, and of barriers to economic integration of immigrants on the future size and composition of
labor force population and on overall participation rates.

T

The base population corresponds to the nearly 7 million respondents to the 2006 Canadian Census long-form questionnaire, adjusted through reweighting for net under coverage by
age, sex, and place of residence. The model projects the evolution of this base population up to 2031. Aggregate tables are
then produced by taking a snapshot of the resulting projected
population at different times.

Projection scenarios

F

ive different projection scenarios are built to assess the
impact of demographic drivers, of participation rates, and
of barriers to economic integration of immigrants on the projected population (Table 1).

Table 1. Assumptions of the five scenarios

Scenario

Imm.
rate
(per
1000)

Fertility
(TFR)

Participation rate

Differentials
between Canadian-born whites and immigrants/visibles
minorities

Low Growth

6.0

1.5

Increasing

Yes

Med. Growth
(Ref.)

7.5

1.7

Increasing

Yes

High growth

9.0

1.9

Increasing

Yes

Constant Participation rate

7.5

1.7

Constant

Yes

No differentials

7.5

1.7

Increasing

No

Population Change and Lifecourse Strategic Knowledge Cluster
Centre for Population, Aging and Health, Western University, London, ON N6A 5C2
Website: http://www.pclc-cppv.ca Email: pclc-cppv@uwo.ca

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pclc_rpb/vol1/iss5/1

2

Bélanger and Bastien: Future Canadian Workers: More Educated and More Culturally diversified
3

Tomorrowʼs Canadian Labor force
The reference scenario assumes a medium demographic
growth, an increase of the participation rates based on recent trends, and the persistence of participation rates differentials between Canadian-born whites and immigrants and
visible minorities.
The low-growth and the high-growth scenarios with respectively low and high assumptions on immigration and fertility
rates reflect the plausible uncertainty of the forecasts of the
demographic drivers.
The fourth scenario keeps the participation rates constant at
the 2010 levels in order to measure the impact of these rates
on the projected labor force population. The other four scenarios assume that the observed recent trends will hold true
in the future, where female participation rates and older
workers participation rates are increasing.
Finally, the fifth scenario assumes that immigrants and visible minority groups have the same age-, sex-, and education
-specific labor force participation rates as the Canadian-born
white population.

Results
All scenarios project that the country’s labor force will grow
steadily. Under the reference (medium-growth) scenario, the
labor force will increase from 17.6 million persons in 2006 to
21.5 million in 2031. This represents an increase of 3.9 million over the next 25 years, which corresponds to an average
annual growth rate of 0.8%. The low-growth scenario projects a workforce of about 1 million smaller than the reference scenario; the high-growth scenario generates a total
about 1 million larger.
If the participation rates were to remain constant at the
2010 level, the labor force population would be reduced in
2031 by about 915,000. Hence, the increasing trend in agespecific participation rates generates a workforce 5% larger
compared to the constant participation rate scenario. Furthermore, under the assumption of no differential in labor
force participation between immigrants and visible minority
groups, there would be half a million more workers in 2031.
Given the aging of the Canadian population, the decline of
the overall labor force participation rate (ages 15+) is virtually unavoidable. Currently at around 67% (see Figure 1),
the rate could decline to between 64% and 60% according to
the different scenarios.

Figure 1. Overall labor force participation rate, observed
and projected, Canada, 1986-2031
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The scenario that attributes to immigrants and visible minorities the same participation rates as the Canadian-born white
population produces the highest overall participation rate
(64%) in 2031. Demographic drivers have little impact on the
projected participation rate.
According to the reference scenario, the projected labor force
population will be older in 2031 than it is today. The projections also show that tomorrow’s Canadian workers will have a
higher level of education and will contain a larger share of foreign born individuals and of visible minorities (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Share of selected characteristics of the labor
force population of Canada in 2006 and 2031 according to
the medium-growth demographic scenario
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Tomorrowʼs Canadian Labor force
Most of the projected labor force growth is expected to occur
among university graduates, while the less educated labor
force is projected to decline. The workforce population with a
university degree is projected to increase from 3.9 million to
9.4 million, and its share of the total labor force is expected
to increase from 22% in 2006 to 44% in 2031. On the other
hand, the workforce with a high school diploma or less is
expected to decline from 7.3 million to 5.3 million, its share
of the total declining from 41% to 25%.

Discussion
In light of the projection results, the authors question the
mainstream view suggesting that Canada faces an important
future labor shortage which should be addressed by increasing immigration intake. They argue that the actual highimmigration policies keep labor costs low rather than allowing the competitive market to raise labor compensation. As a
result, immigrants themselves suffer the most from the
growing economic vulnerability caused by such sustained
high-immigration levels (Green & Green, 2004).

The authors also identify language barriers as main obstacles
preventing newcomers to integrate into the Canadian labor
market. In order to improve immigrants’ language skills, two
solutions are put forward. First, language training should be
offered to immigrants already working in Canada, and second,
the language skills criteria should be made stronger when admitting newcomers under the economic category. Economic
integration of immigrants admitted under the family or refugee
categories or as a dependent of an economic immigrant is also
desirable as they represent 75% of all immigrants selected
yearly by the government.
Finally, the authors suggest that Canadian policymakers should
adapt the human capital model on which the immigrants’ selection is based. For example, in Australia, the government now
favors immigrants with higher potential for employability in
terms of age, language skills, and work skills corresponding to
specific in-demand jobs. This recent Australian immigration
policy has met with success as major improvements following
the reforms were observed in terms of immigrants’ economic
integration (Hawthorne, 2008).

Furthermore, since the projection scenarios demonstrate the
minimal impact of demographic variables on future labor
force participation rates, the authors argue that increasing
immigration cannot alleviate the decline of the overall participation rate (from 67% to 63%) due to population aging.
Instead, a greater economic integration of immigrants would
not only increase the size of the labor force, but would also
significantly mitigate the declining overall participation rate.
Rather than admitting more immigrants to Canada, the authors argue that it would be more effective to encourage
people to postpone retirement, improve work-family balance,
and better integrate immigrants and visible minorities.
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